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"It is easy to forget that important Supreme Court cases involve
people; it is even easier to forget they are rooted in particular places."'
In Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. U.S. Department of Education,2
the Supreme Court applied Chevron review to a school finance case.
Even as the Court heard oral argument in the case, all parties forgot that
the case's outcome would have a profound impact on the people and
places involved. The people are Native American schoolchildren in the
state of New Mexico. The places are two public school districts, Zuni
Public School District, and Gallup-McKinley Public School District,
both located in the Northwest quadrant of the state.
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley are both located on or near tax-exempt
American Indian reservations. As such, the districts are eligible to
receive Impact Aid-federal funding meant to ensure that school districts
are not penalized for their inability to raise revenue for education through
property taxes. If, however, the Department of Education determines
that a state's school finance system equally distributes resources to all
students, the state may offset state funding to impacted districts by the
. Copyright D 2007 by Osamudia R. James. William H. Hastie Fellow, University of
Wisconsin Law School; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2001; J.D., Georgetown University Law
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support me in all my endeavors, professional or personal.
1. Richard Schragger, San Antonio v. Rodriguez and the Legal Geography of School Finance
Reform 1, (UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER SERIES,
Working Paper No. 64, 2007), available at http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uvajpubliclaw/art64.
2. 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).
3. Id. at 1538.
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amount each district receives in Impact Aid.4 Such was the case for the
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley school districts.
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley challenged the Secretary of Education's
use of a formula to determine that New Mexico was equalized. The
statutory interpretation that led to the Secretary's choice of formula was
subject to Chevron review.5 An integral element of Chevron review is to
ensure that the Secretary's interpretation, and its effects, are permissible
in light of congressional intent.6 The Court's compulsion, however, to
decide "who gets to decide" under Chevron review eclipsed any analysis
of the consequences of the Secretary's interpretation and formula choice.
As a result, the two districts are now forced to choose between school
buildings with running water and hiring experienced teachers able to
address the unique learning needs of their Native American students.
Although this is the kind of penalty Congress sought to avoid through
Impact Aid, the Court ignored the problem altogether. The Court's
application of Chevron review in Zuni was too constraining, and
produced an outcome misaligned with congressional intent.
Part II provides the historical context for the case, including a
discussion of the challenges inherent in efforts to equalize financial
resources in education, New Mexico's efforts to equalize funding within
the state, and the federal government's role in ensuring school finance
equity through the Impact Aid program. Part II also briefly summarizes
the procedural history of the case. Parts III and IV explain Chevron
review and how the Court applied Chevron review to the case. Part V
analyzes both the constraining nature of Chevron review in the case, and
the failure of Chevron review to assist the Court in determining whether
agency interpretation was permissible in light of congressional intent and
agency expertise. Part V also resurrects calls for replacement of Chevron
step two with arbitrary and capricious "hard-look" review. This change
would have ensured that the Court considered relevant policy
implications and the practical consequences of the Department's
interpretation when determining whether to extend deference to the
Secretary's decision which had such significant adverse consequences
for Native American schoolchildren in New Mexico.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1540-41.
6. See id. at 1541 (summarizing congressional intent and legislative history).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. School Finance Equity
The dispute about the equity of New Mexico's school finance system
and the appropriateness of the Secretary's equalization formula is a
recent development in the long history of battles regarding education and
school finance equity.7 Although the details of school finance systems
vary from state to state, most states generally delegate responsibility for
raising revenue to individual districts. 8  A district's ability to raise
revenue for its schools is usually determined by the wealth of its tax
base. Thus, disparities in property wealth yield disparities in educational
funding. The role of the state is typically as a partner, ensuring
minimum education needs are met.
States essentially guarantee inequalities in funding by allowing
districts to raise revenue locally for education, particularly when a state
has not adopted an equalization program. As such, some school districts
become "enclaves of affluence," while other districts are left with
minimal fiscal strength. 9  These enclaves have become adept at
convincing legislatures that their advantage is justified, leading some
scholars to note that the public school system in the United States is not
public, but rather "quasi-public" or "quasi-private."' In this quasi-
public system, the interests of wealthier districts are insulated,
geographically defined, and protected by state legislatures that refuse to
enact school funding programs to equalize resources." I  State court
challenges to education financing systems that perpetuate these
inequalities proliferated in the aftermath of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,'2 where the Court held that disparities
caused by school systems that relied on property taxes were not
violations of the United States Constitution because education is not a
fundamental right.' 3 At the heart of these challenges is concern for the
7. See Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 493, 497-502 (1995) (outlining the three waves of school finance litigation at the state and
federal levels).
8. See KERN ALEXANDER & RICHARD G. SALMON, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 18 (1995)
(discussing educational taxation at the state and local level).
9. Id. at 146-47.
10. Id. at 147-48.
11. Id.
12. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
13. Id. at 4-6. "Lawsuits challenging state methods of funding public schools have been
brought in 45 of the 50 states." National Access Network Webpage, http://www.schoolfunding
.info/litigation/lititgation.php3 (last visited Aug. 12, 2007).
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ways in which education finance resources are distributed, and the
relationship between spending and student achievement.
Several equity principles can be utilized when assessing the
distribution of resources, including horizontal equity, vertical equity, and
adequacy. Horizontal equity provides that students who are alike should
be treated alike, and requires that all students receive equal shares of
local and state revenue per pupil. 14 Several statistics assess the level of
horizontal equity within a state, including the federal range ratio. 15 The
federal range ratio, also referred to as a restricted range ratio, is the
formula included in the text of the Impact Aid statute. 16
Vertical equity accounts for the reality that some students need or
deserve more services than others, and that providing more services
requires more funding. 17 Accordingly, achieving vertical equity requires
identifying characteristics that can be used as a basis for distributing
additional resources to certain students, or the programs and school
districts that educate those students.' 8 Student characteristics that justify
additional funding include physical or mental disabilities, educational
disadvantages stemming from a low-income background, or limited
English proficiency.' 9  District characteristics that justify additional
funding might include, for example, unique transportation costs
associated with very large, or very small, districts.20  School program
characteristics, such as vocational programs or magnet schools, may also
warrant additional resources.
2'
Finally, adequacy is defined as "the provision of a set of strategies,
programs, curriculum, and instruction, with appropriate adjustments for
special-needs students, districts, and schools, and their full financing,
that is sufficient to teach students to high standards." 22 To the extent that
adequacy addresses how much is required to educate students based on
each student's individual need, adequacy can be partially addressed
14. ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 60
(2000).
15. ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 8, at 234-39.
16. See id. at 235-36 (explaining that the federal range ratio used by the federal government in
the Impact Aid program is mathematically equivalent to the restricted range ratio).
17. ODDEN & PICUS, supra note 14, at 66-67.
18. Id.
19. Id. See also William H. Clune, Accelerated Education as a Remedy for High Poverty
Schools, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 655, 667-69 (1995) (advocating for the provision of additional
funds for accelerated instruction in high-poverty schools).
20. ODDEN & PICUS, supra note 14, at 67.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 69.
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through a combination of horizontal and vertical equity. 3 At the same
time, adequacy also addresses the relationship between educational
inputs and educational outputs. Educational inputs include "programs,
curriculum, and instruction that are sufficient to teach students to high
standards," while outputs include "the measurement of the achievement
that results. 24  Considering the link between equity and adequacy is
integral to ensuring equal educational opportunities for all students.25
The concept of adequacy, however, has not been without debate.
Some have argued that there is no consistent relationship between money
input and achievement output, and that to obtain more money for
education is simply "throwing good money after bad."26  This
"production-function ' 27 critique of school finance has its origins in the
28Coleman report, which was interpreted as indicating that schools have
little influence on student achievement independent of family
background and social context. 29  The production-function model,
however, has been criticized as inadequate when applied to the education
system.3° Moreover, methodological flaws in the research underlying the
Coleman report have rendered the report's conclusions a result of flawed
23. The two concepts of adequacy and equity are often considered interchangeable, particularly
in school finance reform litigation where remedies can be justified based on either concept. See
Underwood, supra note 7, at 513-19 (equating adequacy and vertical equity). But see William H.
Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 EDUC. POL'Y 376, 376-77 (1994)
(describing the shift away from an equity model to an adequacy model, where the emphasis is no
longer merely on inputs, but on high minimum educational outcomes).
24. ODDEN & PICUS, supra note 14, at 69. See also Clune, supra note 19, at 665-80 (arguing
that adequacy responds to the needs of high-poverty schools by setting "appropriate, high
expectations of performance, and... deliver[ing] the resources and governance necessary to reach
those goals").
25. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION
FINANCE (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
26. ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 8 at 349.
27. Production-function is defined as the maximum amount of product that can be obtained
from a specified combination of inputs. It shows the largest quantity of goods that any particular
collection of inputs is capable of producing. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 410 (1985).
28. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
29. ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 8, at 351.
30. Id. at 356, 359-61. The production-function model was first developed and applied to
industry. Problems with applying the model to education include confusion about the relevant unit
of production (individual pupil, classroom, school, or school district), and whether the chosen unit of
production is "maximizing academic achievement or some other output." Id at 356. Moreover,
studies that apply the model do not identify an underlying theory of learning that defines the
relationship between school inputs and academic achievement. Id For example, the studies all
"assume that teacher inputs can be measured by teacher characteristics," including education,
experience and aptitude, and ignore the way in which these characteristics are actually implicated in
the teaching-learning process. Id (citing WADI D. HADDAD ET AL., EDUCATION AND
DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FOR NEW PRIORITIES 50 (1990)).
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analysis, and an inaccurate reflection of the "underlying behavioral
reality. '31 Since then, several production-function studies addressed the
flaws inherent when the model is applied to education, and found: (1)
"[i]f family income [cannot] be changed, improvement in school outputs
require[s] dramatic increases in inputs or significant changes in resource
combinations;" (2) schools are incapable of improving the life outcomes
of minorities without changing inefficiencies in expenditures for teacher
experience and additional education; and (3) "money is important in
producing higher student test scores when it purchases teachers with
strong literacy skills, reduces class size to eighteen students per teacher,
retains experienced teachers, and increases the number of teachers with
advanced degrees." 32 These conclusions indicate that school finance is
linked to student academic achievement.
Despite the ongoing debate, it is obvious to most that, at the very
minimum, money can buy educational resources like instructional
materials and equipment, new facilities, and increases in the number of
highly trained teachers. It is also clear that communities, wealthy and
poor alike, value the opportunities that additional money can buy.
Indeed, Coons, Clune and Sugarman stated it best when they wrote:
We regard the fierce resistance by rich districts to reform as adequate
testimonial to the relevance of money. Whatever it is that money may
be thought to contribute to the education of children, that commodity is
something highly prized by those who enjoy the greatest measure of it.
If money is inadequate to improve education, the residents of poor
districts should at least have an equal opportunity to be disappointed by
its failure.
33
If one agrees that differences in funding do affect the quality of
education, it is clear that inequalities in the resources of school districts
produce a wide range of educational opportunities afforded to students.
It is a question of basic fairness to ensure that students are not penalized
in terms of their education just because they are born into a family that is
neither wealthy nor fortunate enough to live in a wealthy district. This
issue, and the responsibility of a state to address it, is at the heart of the
Zuni case.
31. Id. at360.
32. Id. at 361-62. See also William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by
Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap
Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721, 725-26 (1992) (arguing that, in well-conceived
educational programs, additional financial input does produce substantial gains in student
achievement).
33. JOHN COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 30 (1970).
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B. New Mexico and School Finance Equity
New Mexico depends on local property taxes to fund public school
education. Like most states that depend on local taxes to fund public
schools, differences in wealth among New Mexico's local education
agencies (LEAs) 34 have led to inequity in school funding. New Mexico
has faced considerable challenges in its effort to address this inequity,
including differences in the depth of district tax bases, poverty levels,
and enrollment figures.
Overall, New Mexico ranks forty-eighth out of fifty states in per
capita personal income, with 23.78% of public school age children living
in poverty.35 The percent of school-age children living in poverty in the
Los Alamos Public School District, however, is a considerably lower
2.53%. 36  In contrast, the percentage of school-age children living in
poverty in Zuni Public School District is 48.22%; the percentage in
Gallup-McKinley Public School District is 37.1 1%.37 In forty-nine of
New Mexico's eighty-nine LEAs, the percentage is 25% or higher;
twenty-six LEAs have percentages over 30%, and seven LEAs have
percentages over 40%.38
Variations in the number of students enrolled in schools across the
state have also impeded efforts to equalize funding. Due to economies of
scale, education costs may be higher in small districts, and research
suggests that "size economies that reduce costs by more than one dollar
per pupil do exist up to but not beyond 200 pupils." 39 The largest school
district in New Mexico is Albuquerque Public Schools, with 94,566
students.40 The smallest school district is the Mosquero district, with a
population of fifty students.4 1
34. Throughout this article the terms "local education agencies" and "school districts" are used
interchangeably.
35. NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N RESEARCH'S REPORT, RANKINGS & ESTIMATES: RANKINGS OF THE
STATES 2004 AND ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS 2005 (2005), available at http://164.64.166
.16/school.budget/nm.stat.05/Section%20A/PDF%20Files/A1 .pdf; N.M. PUB. EDUC. DEP'T,
PERCENT OF POPULATION AGES 4 TO 17 LIVING IN POVERTY, BY DISTRICT (2006), available at
http://www.ped.state.nm.us/div/ais/data/fs/03/05.06.poverty.dist.pdf.
36. N.M. PUB. EDUC. DEP'T, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. ODDEN & PICUS, supra note 14, at 231.
40. N.M. PUB. EDUC. DEP'T, TOTAL STUDENT ENROLLMENT BY DISTRICT, SCHOOL YEAR




Despite these obstacles, New Mexico has remained committed to its
diverse student population,42 and to providing educational services to
students with differing needs.43 In the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,44 a
group of plaintiffs in New Mexico filed a lawsuit alleging that the state's
education finance system, in which school funding expenditures varied
widely based on the wealth of each school district, was in violation of
New Mexico's constitution. 45  The case settled before trial when New
Mexico implemented the 1974 Public School Finance Act, which
required the state to fund the operational costs of all school districts.
46
The Act's funding formula is based on a model developed by the
National Education Finance Project in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
47
and includes a "state equalization guarantee distribution.",48  The
distribution is "that amount of money distributed to each school district
to ensure that the school district's operating revenue, including its local
and federal revenues ... is at least equal to the school district's program
cost. ' 4 9 "Program cost" is defined as the amount of money determined
under New Mexico's funding formula "to be necessary for a given
district with a particular configuration of students and educational
programs to provide educational services. 5 °  The funding formula
determines each district's program cost by using cost differentials to
calculate the price associated with providing educational services to
students with differing needs. 51 The inclusion of these cost differentials
42. 31.1% of public-school students in the state are classified as "Anglo;" 54% are classified as
Hispanic; 11. 1% are classified as Native American; 2.5% are classified as Black; and 1.3% are
classified as Asian. N.M. PUB. EDUC. DEP'T, PERCENT OF STUDENT ENROLLMENT ETHNIC
CATEGORY BY DISTRICT, SCHOOL YEAR 2005-2006 (2006), available at http://www.ped.state.nm.
us/div/ais/data/fs/13/05.06.ethnic.pdf.
43. Brief for Respondent at 15, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct.
1534 (2007) (No. 05-1508), 2006 WL 3740364.
44. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
45. Id. at 4-6.
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-8-1 to -45 (West 2003 & West Supp. 2006).
47. SCH. BUDGET & FIN. ANALYSIS BUREAU, N.M. PUB. EDUC. DEP'T, How NEW MEXICO
PUBLIC SCHOOLS ARE FUNDED 3 (2006), available at http://www.ped.state.nm.us/div/fin/
school.budget/how.nm.schools.are.fundedfy0806-files/How /20NM /20schools /20are /20funded
FY0806.pdf.
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-25.
49. Id.
50. SHARON S. BALL & J. PLACIDO GARCIA, NEW MEXICO 6 (1999), available at http://nces
.ed.gov/edfin/pdf/StFinance/NewMexi.pdf.
51. SCH. BUDGET & FIN. ANALYSIS BUREAU, supra note 47, at 5. For example, research
indicates that the cost of educating secondary school students is more than the cost to educate
primary school students. Id. Moreover, additional funding may be required to provide bilingual
education services to students with a high percentage of English-as-second-language speakers. Id.
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seeks to address vertical equity. The formula also makes adjustments for
several other factors, including a district's "training and experience
index, 52 the number of students served in nonprofit special education
institutions, and the unique challenges faced by small, rural, or newly
created school districts.53
The state equalization guarantee distributions are disbursed from the
Public School Fund.54 When allocating the money, the state reduces its
distribution to a particular district by an amount equal to 75% of what
that district was independently able to raise through taxes. 55 Funds are
distributed in a non-categorical manner, and are not earmarked for
specific programs.56 School districts are allowed to spend their funding
according to local priorities as long as they stay within statutory
guidelines.57
The wealthiest school district in New Mexico enjoys per-pupil
funding of $6520, while the poorest district in the state has per-pupil
funding of $2672-a difference of 144%.58 Outliers will always exist,
however, because political concerns often make it unfeasible to eliminate
all disparity by completely transferring the resources of one community
to another.59 Indeed, when devising a school finance formula to
equitably fund schools throughout the state, New Mexico sought to
"equalize educational opportunity at the highest possible revenue level
while minimizing the financial loss to the richest districts.
' 60
Accordingly, despite the lingering outliers, New Mexico is lauded as
having one of the most equalized funding formulas in the nation.61 The
state's equalization guarantee distribution accounts for more than 90% of
52. BALL & GARCIA, supra note 50, at 5. A district's training and experience index is based on
the academic classifications and the experience levels of teachers in the district. Id.
53. Id. at 6.
54. The Public School Fund also contains funding for district transportation costs, as well as
supplemental costs like out-of-state tuition, emergency financial need distributions, and unexpected
capital outlay emergencies. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 3. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-25(B) (West 2003 & West Supp. 2006), BALL &
GARCIA, supra note 50, at 3.
56. FOUNDS. FOR GREAT PUB. SCHS., How Is NEW MEXICO'S PUBLIC SCHOOL BUDGET
CRAFTED AT THE STATE LEVEL? 2-3 (2004), available at http://nea-nm.org/PDF/sprtm04materials
/Crafting%20the%2OState%2OBudget.pdf.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Brief for the Petitioners at 20-21, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127
S. Ct. 1534 (2007) (No. 05-1508), 2006 WL 3350569.
59. See John Dayton, When All Else Has Failed: Resolving the School Funding Problem, 1995
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 5 (discussing the tension between the altruistic wish for education equity for
all children and the self-interest of wanting the best for one's own children).
60. SCH. BUDGET & FIN. ANALYSIS BUREAU, supra note 47, at 3.
61. NewRules.org, New Mexico's School Funding Formula, http://www.newrules.org/equity/
nnifund.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2007).
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operational revenue for school districts, and is the largest state
distribution.62
C. Federal Support for Equalization: Impact Aid
The Federal government has recognized the impediment that tax-
exempt federal lands, such as Indian reservations, can pose to an LEA's
efforts to raise money for public schools through property taxes.
Congress addressed this problem by enacting the Impact Aid program in
1950.63 The program provides funding to those school districts with
compromised ability to levy taxes in support of public schools due to the
presence of tax-exempt federal property within the district.64  The
program also provides federal funds to local school districts to assist with
the costs of providing "educational services to federally connected
children., 65 "Federally connected children" are defined as those children
whose parents are in the military, children who reside on Indian lands or
federal property, and children whose parents are employed on federal
property.
66
As originally passed, the Impact Aid statute did not speak to whether
a state could consider the Aid when allocating funding to LEAs. In
1968, Congress addressed this issue by amending the Impact Aid statute
to prohibit states from taking into account the receipt of Impact Aid
when allocating educational funding. 67 In 1974, however, as states like
New Mexico began efforts to equalize state funding, Congress became
concerned that the "[i]nability to consider impact aid payments for the
purposes of establishing an equalized level of expenditure seriously
interfered with state plans for school finance reform." 68  Wanting to
encourage state equalization efforts, Congress changed the Impact Aid
program to include an exception: if a state administers a program that
equalizes funding for school districts in the state, when determining
funding allocations to each LEA the state may consider an LEA's receipt
of Impact Aid and offset state funding accordingly. 69 The purpose of the
62. SCH. BUDGET & FIN. ANALYSIS BUREAU, supra note 47, at 2.
63. Act of Sept. 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1106 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 7701-14 (2000)).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 7701(1) (2000).
65. Id. § 7701.
66. Id. § 7701(2)-(5).
67. Id. § 7709(a).
68. S. REP. No. 93-763, at 55 (1974).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1); H.R. REP. No. 93-805, at 42 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4093, 4128-29 ("The amendment adopted by the Committee will allow States to
[Vol. 56
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exception was to "prevent [I]mpact [A]id from hindering states'
equalization efforts and [to prevent] duplicative compensation [to] school
districts affected by federal activity (once by the federal government
through impact aid and a second time by the state's equalization
program). 70
When Congress amended the Impact Aid statute to allow states to
consider Impact Aid payments as long as the state ensured that
operational expenditures were equalized among LEAs, the job of
determining whether a state was "equalized" was left to the Secretary of
Education.71  Accordingly, the Secretary promulgated regulations, the
appendix of which outlined several steps for determining whether a state
was equalized. First, LEAs within a state were to be ranked in order of
per-pupil revenue.72  Second, the per-pupil revenue of the highest and
lowest ranked LEAs would be compared to determine whether
expenditures were indeed equalized throughout the state.73 If the
disparity between the highest and lowest ranked LEAs was no more than
25%, the state would be considered equalized.74
During the public notice and comment process, the Secretary
expressed concern that outlier LEAs at the top and bottom of the ranked
list would distort the true nature of a state's operational funding.
75
Commentators proposed various methods to help minimize the impact of
outliers, including (1) excluding districts above the ninety-fifth and
below the fifth percentiles based on the number of districts ranked, or (2)
excluding schools above the ninety-fifth and below the fifth percentiles
based on the number of pupils in each of the ranked school districts.76
consider impact aid payments ... as local resources under State equalization formulas if the
Secretary of HEW determines that such formulas provide appropriate recognition of the relative tax
resources per child to be educated which are available to local educational agencies .... The
Committee has adopted this amendment because it believes that Federal education laws should not
serve as an impediment to State actions designed to fulfill the judicial mandates and legislative
actions removing the often close relationship between values of property and quality of education in
a school district.").
70. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE EFFORTS TO EQUALIZE
FUNDING BETWEEN WEALTHY AND POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 16 (1998), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98092.pdf.
71. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 3-4, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007) (No. 05-1508), 2006 WL 3742248 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 240(d)(2)(B),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-382, providing that the term "equalize expenditures" would be "defined
by the Secretary by regulation").
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4-5.
75. Interim Regulations for Treatment of Payments Under State Equalization Programs, 41 Fed.




The Secretary rejected the former suggestion and decided that
percentile cut-offs would be based on the number of pupils rather than
the number of school districts.77 As justification, the Secretary noted that
percentile cut-offs based on the number of districts would apply the
disparity standard in an unfair and inconsistent manner among states.78
In states with a small number of large districts, an exclusion based on the
percentage of school districts might exclude a substantial percentage of
the pupil population, resulting in a comparison that would not accurately
reflect the experience of a significant portion of students in the state.79
Conversely, in states with a large number of small districts, the same
approach might exclude only an insignificant portion of the pupil
80population.
The Secretary's chosen formula was not without its own
methodological infirmities. When applied to a state with a large number
of small school districts, like New Mexico, an equalization formula that
bases percentile cut-offs on student population will generally eliminate
larger numbers of LEAs, making it more likely that disparities between
school districts will be camouflaged. Despite this potential problem, the
Secretary's formula was promulgated in 1976; the body of the regulation
contained the permitted 25% disparity, whereas the equalization formula
which addressed methodology was produced in an appendix.8 The
Impact Aid statute itself did not codify any of the equalization standards
or identify an equalization methodology.
An example is illuminating for purposes of understanding exactly
how the Secretary's formula is applied. In fiscal year 2000, New Mexico
had 317,777 students, and eighty-nine school districts.82 Those districts
can be ranked in order of per-pupil expenditures. Mosquero district is
ranked first, with a per-pupil revenue of $6520.83 Des Moines district is
ranked eighty-ninth, with a per-pupil revenue of $2672.84 If the
equalization formula based percentile cut-offs on the number of school
districts ranked, the first five and the last five districts would be
disregarded so as to identify the per-pupil revenue for the LEA that
serves pupils at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentile of the number of




81. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 4-6 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 222.63 (1993),
regulations codifying the Secretary's formula under the later repealed § 240).
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LEAs in the state. To determine disparity, the per-pupil revenue of the
sixth-ranked Maxwell district, $3591, and the per-pupil revenue of the
eighty-fourth ranked Gadsden district, $2829, would be compared.85
Because $3591 exceeds $2829 by more than 25%, the state would be
deemed un-equalized for purposes of Impact Aid.
What the Secretary's equalization formula requires instead, however,
is that the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles be determined by reference to
a district's student population. 8 6 The effect is to identify the per-pupil
revenue for the LEA that serves pupils at the ninety-fifth and fifth
percentiles of the student population in the state. Applied to New
Mexico's eighty-nine LEAs, enough LEAs must be eliminated from the
top of the ranking to account for 15,888 students, or as close to that
figure as possible without going over. Similarly, enough LEAs have to
be eliminated from the bottom of the ranking to account for 15,888
students, or as close to that figure as possible without going over. Under
this formula, twenty-three LEAs are eliminated, and the per-pupil
revenue of the eighteenth-ranked Penasco district, $3259, is compared to
the per-pupil revenue of the eighty-third-ranked Hobbs district, $2848.87
Because $3259 exceeds $2848 by only 14.43%, New Mexico is
considered equalized for purposes of Impact Aid.
In 1994 Congress re-authorized Impact Aid. This time, the statute
itself codified the standards for determining whether a state's educational
funding is equalized.88 The statute reads that a state is equalized if "the
amount of per-pupil expenditure made by, or per-pupil revenues
available to, the local educational agency in the State with the highest
such per-pupil expenditures or revenues [does] not exceed the amount of
such per-pupil expenditures made by, or per-pupil revenues available to,
the local educational agency in the State with the lowest such
expenditures or revenues by more than 25 percent., 89 The statute further
states that LEAs above the ninety-fifth or below the fifth percentile in
per-pupil expenditures should be disregarded for purposes of determining
disparity. 90 Finally, when making determinations of equalization, the
statute directs the Secretary to consider the additional costs a state incurs
when providing education in unique school districts, such as those that
85. See id
86. See Interim Regulations for Treatment of Payments Under State Equalization Programs, 41
Fed. Reg. 26,320, 26,324 (June 25, 1976).
87. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 58, at 20-21.
88. 20 U.S.C. § 7709 (2000).
89. Id. § 7709(b)(2)(A).
90. Id. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i).
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are geographically isolated or have children with disabilities. 9' Unlike
the previous statute, which left equalization formulas entirely up to the
Secretary, the language of this statute spoke directly to how equalization
was to be determined. It did not reference the weighted ranking
methodology that the Secretary had employed for eighteen years.
In September of 1995, the Secretary promulgated regulations in
furtherance of the re-authorization. Those regulations reflected the
statute's mandate that districts be ranked by per-pupil expenditures, and
that LEAs with per-pupil expenditures or revenues above the ninety-fifth
or below the fifth percentile would be disregarded for purposes of
determining disparity.92 The regulations also, however, made reference
to an appendix that outlined the "method for calculating the percentage
of disparity."93 This appendix essentially repeated the language from the
1976 appendix, and mandated that a weighted ranking based on the
population of each school district in the state be made.
D. Background and Procedural History of Zuni
Zuni Public School District and Gallup-McKinley Public School
District (collectively referred to as "Petitioners") challenged the
Secretary's equalization formula. Petitioners also challenged the
determination that New Mexico operates an equalized funding program
which allows New Mexico to consider the Impact Aid received by both
districts when determining state funding allocations.94 The Zuni Public
School District is located entirely within the Pueblo of Zuni Reservation,
and has virtually no tax base. 95  Similarly, over 65% of the Gallup-
McKinley Public School District consists of Navajo Reservation lands
that are "not taxable by state school districts. 96  At stake was
Petitioners' share of approximately fifty million dollars in Impact Aid, an
amount by which New Mexico currently offsets the districts'
equalization distribution.97
91. Id. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(ii).
92. 34 C.F.R. § 222.162 (2007).
93. Id.
94. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127
S. Ct. 1534 (2007) (No. 05-1508), 2006 WL 1491269.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 58, at 2.
97. Id. at 4. The Impact Aid funding received by Petitioners accounts for almost one-half of all
Impact Aid distributed to New Mexico LEAs. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at
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A certification hearing to determine whether operational funding for
public education in New Mexico was equalized for the 1999-2000 fiscal
year was held in 1999. There, the Secretary of Education determined
that New Mexico's funding scheme was equalized. 98 Petitioners sought a
hearing before a U.S. Department of Education administrative law judge
to challenge both the method used to make the determination, and the
determination itself. The judge upheld the Secretary's determination that
New Mexico's funding scheme was equalized. 99  Petitioners then
appealed to the Secretary, who denied the appeal.
In 2004, Petitioners appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A three judge panel issued an opinion in December of 2004 in which two
of the three judges affirmed the Secretary's decision.'00  Petitioners
successfully petitioned for a rehearing en bane, and in February of 2006
a twelve member panel issued a one paragraph decision stating that the
Secretary's decision was affirmed by virtue of an equally divided
Court. 101
Petitioners appealed from the Tenth Circuit's en banc decision. On
September 26, 2006 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and oral
arguments in the case were heard on January 10, 2007. Oral arguments
focused exclusively on the application of Chevron review to the case.
On April 17, 2007, the Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming
the Tenth Circuit's decision.102  Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer
explained that the history and purpose behind the Impact Aid statute
rendered the Secretary's methodology reasonable. 10 3  Moreover, the
Secretary's methodology fell within the scope of the statute's plain
language. '04
98. In re Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, Docket No. 99-8 1-1 (Dep't of Educ. April 17, 2001),
available at http://www.ed-oha.org/cases/1999-81-i.html. Petitioners highlighted that the
administrative law judge shared their concerns regarding the Secretary's formula as outlined in the
appendix. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 94, at 7-8.
99. Id.
100. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 393 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2004),
vacateden banc, 437 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2006).
101. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 437 F.3d 1289, 1290 (10th Cir. 2006),
aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007). The failure of the panel to issue a decision one way or another has led
to confusion as to why certiorari was granted in the case, particularly in light of the absence of a
circuit split on the issue and the relatively small size of Impact Aid compared to other federal
education programs. See Ebonne Ruffins, Zuni Public School District No. 89, et al. v. United States
Department of Education, et al., Medill News Service, http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/
archives/003885.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (interviewing Leigh Manasevit, Special Assistant
Attorney General for New Mexico).
102. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).




III. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CHEVRON REVIEW
The Chevron case involved a challenge to the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the meaning of the phrase
"stationary source" as found in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977.105 In 1981, the agency conducted a rulemaking proceeding and
revised its interpretation of "stationary source" to refer to an entire
plant.10 6 Referred to as the "bubble concept," 10 7 the effect was to allow a
plant to increase pollution emissions from an individual pollution
emitting device without triggering EPA intervention as long as net
emissions for the plant were not increased as a whole. 10 8 A plant could
achieve this by increasing emissions from an individual pollution
emitting device, while simultaneously decreasing emissions from another
device. 09 The D.C. Circuit determined that there was no clear definition
of the phrase "stationary source" in the text or legislative history of the
Clean Air Act. 110 The D.C. Circuit went on to independently evaluate
the EPA's interpretation 11 and determined that the interpretation was
inconsistent with the objectives of the Clean Air Act. 1
12
In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court established a two-
part test for reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
105. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40 (1984).
106. Id. at 857-59.
107. Id. at 840; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'don other grounds, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
108. Natural Res. Def. Council, 685 F.2d at 720 n. 1.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 723.
111. Id. at 725 ("[Tlhe central issue confronting us is whether EPA's discretion under the Clean
Air Act is sufficiently broad to allow it to apply the bubble concept to the nonattainment program.").
112. Id. at 726-27 ("[W]e must conclude that the bubble concept may not be employed in [the
nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act]. The nonattainment program's raison d'etre is to
ameliorate the air's quality in nonattainment areas .... This purpose... rules out application of the
bubble concept to the nonattainment program." (internal citation omitted)).
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is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.
113
The Court further elaborated that gaps and ambiguities in statutes
indicate an "implied" delegation114 of interpretive authority.1 5
Because of the two-part test it articulated, Chevron has been
described as "one of very few defining cases... in American public
law. ' 116  Chevron fundamentally impacted the relationship between
courts and agencies in administrative law, despite the intention of the
test's creators to issue a routine environmental law opinion. 7  if
Congress has not directly spoken, a court using Chevron review defers to
an agency's interpretation of a statute as long as the interpretation is a
"permissible construction of the statute."' 8  Courts have used various
tests to determine what constitutes a "permissible construction,"
including examining whether an interpretation is consistent with a
statute's plain language or meaning,1 9 underlying congressional intent or
purpose, 120 or legislative history.'
2'
Chevron review, however, also recognizes agency expertise and
political accountability. 22  The Court has noted that deference to an
113. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(internal citations omitted).
114. The assertion that ambiguity is an implied delegation has been challenged. See, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 445 (1989) ("A
rule of deference in the face of ambiguity would be inconsistent with understandings, endorsed by
Congress, of the considerable risks posed by administrative discretion. An ambiguity is simply not a
delegation of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two." (internal citation omitted)).
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. Prior to Chevron, courts were said to only have a duty to
defer when Congress expressly delegated authority to an agency to "'define a statutory term or
prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision."' Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (quoting United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455
U.S. 16, 24 (1982)).
116. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075
(1990).
117. Ironically, scholars have noted that the Chevron court never intended for the case to so
fundamentally impact the law of deference, and that papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall
contain no evidence that any justice considered the case any more than a routine opinion in
environmental law. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1997) (referring to the research in Robert V. Pervical, Environmental
Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,613
(1993)).
118. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
119. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992).
120. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,453 (1987).
121. NationsBank ofN.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995).
122. The Chevron case itself made only implicit reference to agency expertise as a rationale for
judicial deference, writing that the regulatory scheme at issue was "technical and complex," and that
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agency's permissible construction of a statute is justified in part because
of an agency's greater familiarity with constantly changing facts and
circumstances surrounding the issue being regulated. 123  Moreover, in
areas where the subject matter of a statute is technical or complex,
agencies are particularly authorized to fill in gaps where statutes are
silent. 124  The Court has also noted that although "agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is.'
25
Accordingly, it is appropriate for executive agencies to make policy
choices and address competing interests that Congress either failed to
resolve or intentionally left to the agency for administration.
126
IV. APPLYING CHEVRON REVIEW TO ZUNI
A. The Application of Chevron Review in Zuni
Supreme Court briefs and oral argument in Zuni focused exclusively
on whether the Secretary's determination should be given Chevron
deference. 127  Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, has
complicated determinations of when Chevron review applies to
administrative decisions. Coined "step-zero" analysis, scholars have
identified three cases in which the Court has attempted to clarify the
Congress may have "consciously desired the [agency] to strike the balance.., thinking that those
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a
better position to do so." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
123. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). See also Balt. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Nat'l Res. Def Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (noting the well established rule that
when a court is reviewing predictions within an agency's area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science, the "court must generally be at its most deferential").
124. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002) (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
126. Id. at 864-66. See also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2375-77 (2001) (arguing that the degree of deference given to an agency should be based on
presidential influence on agency action, as indicated by whether the agency is independent of the
executive branch; higher levels of presidential involvement with executive branch agencies warrant
higher degrees of deference).
127. The question presented on certiorari was:
Whether the Secretary has the authority to create and impose his formula over the one
prescribed by Congress and through this process certify New Mexico's operational
funding for fiscal year 1999-2000 as "equalized," thereby diverting the Impact Aid
subsidies to the State and whether this is one of the rare cases where this Court should
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to correct a plain error that affects all State school
districts that educate federally connected children.
Supreme Court Docket, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-0l508qp.pdf (last visited Sept. 12,
2007).
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applicability of Chevron analysis:
2 8 Christensen v. Harris County,
129
United States v. Mead Corp.,'
130 and Barnhart v. Walton.
t3
1
Christensen involved the validity of an opinion letter issued by the
Department of Labor concerning compensatory time. The Court
determined application of the Chevron framework was unwarranted
because, similar to policy statements or enforcement guidelines, the letter
lacked the force of law and could be distinguished from those
interpretations arrived at after "formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking."'
132
Mead further clarified the relationship between agency rulemaking
and the processes used by agencies to interpret statutes. Deciding that a
tariff ruling by the United States Custom Service was not entitled to
Chevron deference, the Court explained that Chevron analysis was
applicable when "it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority."' 133 A good indication of such delegation is
congressional authorization to "engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed." 134 Mead also noted, however, that Chevron analysis might be
applicable even when formal procedures were not employed by the
agency.135
Finally, Barnhart built upon the principle in Mead which suggested
that Chevron analysis might be applicable even when an agency did not
use formal procedures and the "agency's actions lacked the force of
law."' 136 In ruling that the Social Security Administration's initial use of
less formal procedures to develop regulations did not preclude Chevron
deference, the Court explained that Chevron deference would depend on
the "interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue.'
137
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer rejected a simple deference rule,
and instead advocated for a case-by-case inquiry which would examine
"the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
128. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 211 (2006).
129. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
130. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
131. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
132. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
133. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
134. Id. at 229.
135. Id. at 231.
136. Sunstein, supra note 128, at 216.
137. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
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Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time ... ,,38
Taken together, the three cases suggest that the application of the
Chevron framework, and the ultimate extension of Chevron deference,
will depend on Congress' instructions in a particular statutory scheme.
Although the "grant of authority to act with the force of law" is
sufficient, it is not a necessary condition for a court to "find that
Congress has granted an agency the power to interpret ambiguous"
statutes.' 39
The Secretary of Education is authorized by law to "make,
promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations" in order to
govern programs administered by the Department of Education and carry
out functions vested in the Secretary by law. 140 At issue in Zuni was the
Secretary's interpretation through regulation of the Impact Aid statute
the Department is charged with administering. As such, Zuni involved
the type of rulemaking through regulation which was recognized in Mead
as warranting Chevron analysis. Although the Secretary declined to
follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures when promulgating
the regulations at issue, the APA's "good cause" exemption allows
agencies to make rules that are binding and have the force of law, even
without a notice-and-comment process. 41 In this case, the Secretary
utilized the exemption. 
142
Moreover, the Impact Aid Statute explicitly directs the Secretary of
Education to determine whether a state has a program in effect that
equalizes expenditures for public education, and if so, to certify that
state's program as equalized.14 1 Only then may a state offset their
education funding to a district by the amount of Impact Aid received by
138. Id.
139. Sunstein, supra note 128, at 218.
140. 20 U.S.C. § 122le-3 (2000) ("The Secretary, in order to carry out functions otherwise
vested in the Secretary by law or by delegation of authority pursuant to law, and subject to
limitations as may be otherwise imposed by law, is authorized to make, promulgate, issue, rescind,
and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of operation of, and governing the applicable
programs administered by, the Department.").
141. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2000).
142. Brief for Respondent, supra note 43, at 42.
143. See 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1) (2000) ("A State may reduce aid to a local educational agency
that receives a payment under [Impact Aid] ... if the Secretary determines ... that the State has in
effect a program of State aid that equalizes expenditures for free public education among local
educational agencies in the State."); id. § 7709(b)(2)(B) ("In making a determination under this
subsection, the Secretary shall .... "); id. § 7709(c)(3)(A) ("If the Secretary determines that a
program of State aid qualifies under subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary shall certify the
program and so notify the State.").
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that district. These adjudications carry the force of law, as they are
binding on the states. In this sense, the Secretary is engaging in the type
of adjudication that was also recognized in Mead as warranting Chevron
analysis.
In light of the rulemaking and adjudicatory nature of the Secretary's
actions, the application of Chevron analysis to the Zuni case was
appropriate. Accordingly, the Court's opinion focused on the two prongs
of Chevron review: (1) whether Congress spoke directly to how
equalization was to be determined in the Impact Aid Statute; and (2)
assuming Congress was silent or ambiguous regarding equalization
determinations, whether the Secretary's determination was a permissible
and reasonable interpretation of the statute. 144
Application of Chevron review to the Zuni case was not simple,
despite the doctrine's seemingly straightforward two-part test. Briefs
filed in the Supreme Court, as well as oral argument, focused heavily on
the first prong of Chevron: whether Congress had spoken directly to the
method which must be used for purposes of determining whether a state
operates an equalized education system. 145 Petitioners' brief argued that
the explicit language used by Congress in the 1994 statute requires that
the Secretary disregard LEAs with per-pupil expenditures or revenues
above the ninety-fifth and below the fifth percentile of such expenditures
in the state. 146  Accordingly, an equalization formula that requires a
weighted ranking of LEAs based on population is in direct contradiction
with congressional intent and is completely precluded by the language of
the statute. 147  Petitioners pointed out that counsel for both the
Department and New Mexico admitted to this conflict during the
administrative hearing on the issue. 1
48
Petitioners also argued that even if Congress was not entirely clear,
and the second step of Chevron review was warranted, traditional tools
of statutory construction, including performing a "natural reading,"
considering "interpretive clues" from Congress, and viewing the statute
in its "textual setting," all illustrate that as of 1994 the Secretary was
144. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
145. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 43.
146. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 58, at 14-15, 31.
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id. at 25-26 (noting that Department counsel explained that the only way in which
ambiguity in the language of the Impact Aid statute could be proven was by reference to the
statutory purpose of the program, and that New Mexico Department of Education's counsel admitted
that, on its face, the Department's regulations were "probably not" consistent with the language of
the Impact Aid statute).
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precluded from using his weighted average. 149  Petitioners noted that
Congress was aware that the Secretary used a weighted formula and
could have easily adopted language incorporating the formula into the
statute but declined to do so.' 50 Moreover, because the two formulas are
mutually exclusive, it was unlikely that Congress could have implicitly
contemplated the weighted average.151 Finally, the Secretary's formula
was completely at odds with Congress' intent to ensure that LEAs
eligible to receive Impact Aid actually receive the benefit of that Aid
unless the state's educational funding is equalized.152  Therefore, the
Secretary's interpretation was not "permissible."'
153
To the extent that Chevron and its progeny reinforced the cardinal
rule that Chevron review begins first with an examination of the text, a
plain reading of the Impact Aid statute seems to reinforce Petitioners'
position. In response, however, New Mexico and the U.S. Department of
Education argued that the language of the statute did not unambiguously
answer the "precise question at issue." 154 That is, statutory language did
not address "whether, when applying the [ninety-fifth] and [fifth]
percentile exclusions set forth in the statute, the Secretary is required to
eliminate [five percent] of the LEAs from each end of the spectrum...
or instead may eliminate the outlying five percentiles of pupils."'
' 55
Furthermore, New Mexico argued that the language of the Impact Aid
statute was ambiguous. Although the statute instructs the Secretary to
disregard LEAs with per-pupil expenditures above and below certain
percentiles, the statute does not specify a methodology for doing so.
56
The statute neither provides the Department with directions for
determining the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles of "per-pupil revenues,"
nor makes clear what is meant by the phrase "per-pupil expenditures or
revenues above the ninety-fifth or below the fifth percentile of those
expenditures or revenues in the State."' 57  What Petitioners failed to
consider, argued New Mexico, is that "per-pupil revenues in the state"
may refer to all per-pupil revenues for which each LEA is responsible. 58
149. Id. at 31-33 (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586, 597
(2004)).
150. Id. at 35.
151. Id. at 36-37.
152. Id. at 37, 46.
153. Id. at 45-46.
154. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 19-20; Brief for Respondent, supra note
43, at 22-23.
155. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 19-20 (citation and emphasis omitted).
156. Brief for Respondent, supra note 43, at 23.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 20, 25-26.
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Accordingly, every student in the state has a "per-pupil revenue" which
must be accounted for in the equalization formula.159
The rest of New Mexico's arguments were devoted to proving that
the Secretary's interpretation was indeed permissible under step two of
Chevron review, and made heavy use of legislative history and
congressional intent analysis. New Mexico noted that the Secretary
historically maintained three regulatory options under which a state
could qualify as equalized, and that it was at the Secretary's request that
Congress even altered the Impact Aid regulatory scheme in 1994.160 In
fact, the Secretary drafted what would become the language of the
reenacted Impact Aid program, and that language suggested an
equalization method would be placed in the appendix.' 61  As such,
despite the language of the statute, it would be illogical to believe that
the Department was rejecting its own disparity test, or advocating that
Congress adopt a disparity test based on a formula the Secretary had
already rejected in 1976.162 Rather, the Secretary's intent to include a
weighted ranking in the equalization formula based on student
population was imputed to Congress. 163 Moreover, New Mexico argued
that the statutory scheme as a whole supports the Secretary's
interpretation as illustrated by the fact that Impact Aid awards are
calculated using a method which considers the pupil population of an
LEA. 164 Finally, Petitioners' formula removed only ten LEAs for
purposes of determining equalization. 165 According to New Mexico, the
results of Petitioners' formula amounted to an insignificant portion of the
student population and failed to completely eliminate anomalous
outliers.1
66
The Department of Education, as federal respondent, made an
additional statutory construction argument in support of the Secretary's
interpretation. The same Act through which Congress enacted Impact
Aid also enacted the Education Finance Incentive Grant Program (EFIG).
EFIG is another program that seeks to encourage equitable education
159. Id. at25-26.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 6-8.
162. Id. at 30-31.
163. Id.
164. Brief for Respondent, supra note 43, at 27-30.
165. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 11-12.




funding within states.167 Not only does the statutory language of EFIG
require the Secretary to consider the number of pupils in each LEA when
assessing expenditure disparity,1 68 but the EFIG program also extends
favorable treatment to a state as long as that state meets the disparity
standard described in the regulations promulgating the 1994 Impact Aid
program. 169  To be sure, the language of the EFIG statute makes
reference only to the body of the Impact Aid regulations, and makes no
reference to the weighted ranking requirement included in the appendix
of the regulations. 170  Nevertheless, the Department of Education
considered the reference to Impact Aid regulations as encompassing the
appendix, and argued that Congress could not be considered to have
explicitly endorsed the Secretary's Impact Aid formula for EFIG, but
implicitly prohibited it under the Impact Aid program. 171
B. The Court's Opinion
The Court's decision largely mirrored the arguments made by
Respondents in their briefs and at oral argument, and focused primarily
on whether discretion to choose an equalization formula had been
delegated to the Department. 172 Writing for the majority, and joined by
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Alito, Justice Breyer employed
a tortured interpretation of the Chevron review doctrine to decide that the
Secretary's interpretation and methodology was both reasonable and
within the scope of the Impact Aid statute's plain language. 173 The Court
broke Chevron's rule requiring that analysis begin with whether
167. 20 U.S.C. § 6337 (2000). See also Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 28-
29 ("Grants to States under EFIG are based on an 'equity factor,' which-like the equalization test
in the Impact Aid statute-aims to measure the degree of variation in per-pupil expenditures among
a State's LEAs.").
168. 20 U.S.C. § 6337(b)(3)(A)(ii)(Il) ("Variation[:] In computing coefficients of variation, the
Secretary shall weigh the variation between per-pupil expenditures in each local educational agency
and the average per-pupil expenditures in the State according to the number of pupils served by the
local educational agency.").
169. See id. § 6337(b)(3)(B) ("Special rule[:] The equity factor for a State that meets the
disparity standard described in section 222.162 of title 34, Code of Federal Regulations ....").
170. See 34 C.F.R. § 222.162(a)(2007) ("Percentage disparity limitation[:] The Secretary
considers that a State aid program equalizes expenditures if the disparity in the amount of current
expenditures or revenues per pupil for free public education among LEAs in the State is no more
than 25 percent. In determining the disparity percentage, the Secretary disregards LEAs with per
pupil expenditures or revenues above the 95th or below the 5th percentile of those expenditures or
revenues in the State. The method for calculating the percentage of disparity in a State is in the
appendix to this subpart.").
171. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 7 1, at 30.
172. See generally Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).
173. Id. at 1544.
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Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue through the
statutory language. 74  Instead, the Court first considered the
reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation.1 75 After considering the
history and "basic purpose" of Impact Aid, 176 the Court noted that
calculations for determining whether a state is "equalized" are the type of
"highly technical, specialized interstitial matters" that Congress delegates
to specialized agencies.1 77  Second, the failure of any member of
Congress to criticize the Secretary's methodology or suggest a revision
illustrated historical support for the Secretary's interpretation., 78 Finally,
the Secretary's formula was methodologically sound in ensuring the
adequate elimination of outliers that may skew disparity
determinations. 1
79
After establishing reasonableness, the Court addressed the plain
language of the Impact Aid statute. 180 According to the Court, the phrase
"above the 95th percentile ... of ... [per pupil] expenditures," when
taken with "absolute literalness," limits the Secretary to calculation
methods that involve "per-pupil expenditures."' 8' The Court went on to
explain that the word "percentile" refers to the distribution of "some
population into 100 parts."'' 82  Although the statute mandated which
relevant characteristic (per pupil expenditure) must be used to create
cutoffs in that distribution, the statute did not specify which population is
to be distributed. 83 This ambiguity was further highlighted by the fact
that the statute concerns both students and school districts. 184 As such,
the Secretary was free to define the population, in this case defining it by
number of students instead of by number of LEAs. This grant of
discretion to the Secretary was supported by the fact that Congress had
avoided comparable ambiguity in other statutes by explicitly identifying
the relevant population. The use of more general language in the Impact
Aid statute gave the Secretary the "authority to resolve such subsidiary
174. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)
("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." (emphasis added)).
175. Zuni, 127 S. Ct. at 1540-41.
176. Id. at 1541.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1541-43.
180. Id. at 1543.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1544.
184. Id. at 1546.
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matters at the administrative level."185  Finally, the Court drew
reassurance from the failure of any statistician to challenge the Court's
reading.' 
86
Justice Scalia penned a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas, and partially joined by Justice Souter, in which he
characterized the majority's reasoning as the "elevation of judged-
supposed legislative intent over clear statutory text," made obvious by a
majority opinion which begins with the second, instead of the first, step
of Chevron review.1 87 As an initial matter, the Secretary's implementing
regulations did not resemble the Impact Aid statute, placing them at odds
with the statutory language. Moreover, there was no ambiguity
regarding which population is to be used for distribution, as the statute
makes clear that LEAs are the only relevant population and "makes no
mention of student population whatsoever."'188 Furthermore, the majority
considered statutory context and erroneously concluded that Impact Aid
is about both students and school districts. Rather, the Impact Aid statute
focuses on LEAs instead of number of pupils, and includes an
equalization formula designed to address funding disparities between
LEAs, and not individual students.
18 9
Justice Scalia went on to note that the only thing about congressional
intent that can be known for sure is that both Houses of Congress agreed
upon the text of the statute. 190  In addition, Congress specifically
incorporated student population into disparity determinations in other
parts of the Act containing the Impact Aid statute. As such, Congress
could have done the same thing with Impact Aid, and chose not to. 9'
Justice Scalia further argued that by constructing a congressional intent
that was not reflected in the legislative record, the majority not only
unfairly expected schools to "pore over some 30 years of regulatory
history to divine Congress's 'real' objective," but also "deprive[d]
legislators of the assurance [that their use] of ordinary terms ... will be
given a predictable meaning."'
' 92
Regarding methodology, Justice Scalia argued that the Court lacked
school finance expertise sufficient to affirm the desirability of a
185. Id. at 1545.
186. Id. at 1546.
187. Id. at 1551.
188. Id. at 1553.
189. Id. at 1555.
190. Id. at 1556.
191. Id. at 1558.
192. Id. at 1557.
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methodology that resulted in the elimination of approximately one-
quarter of New Mexico school districts from a disparity determination.'
93
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's concerns regarding
outliers was unfounded, as parts of the statute specifically direct the
Secretary to consider those aspects of state aid programs that consider
the additional costs of providing education in unique districts. 1
94
Justice Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he
conceded that Congress probably intended for the Secretary to continue
to follow the disparity methodology devised prior to re-authorization of
the Impact Aid statute.' 95 Nevertheless, for the reasons explained in
Justice Scalia's dissent, the language of the statute was unambiguous and
in contradiction with the Secretary's methodology.
96
V. THE CONSTRAINTS OF CHEVRON REVIEW
Missing from the briefs submitted in the case, the oral arguments,
and the Court's opinions, is detailed discussion about the effects of the
equalization formulas on New Mexico public schoolchildren in terms of
horizontal equity, vertical equity, or adequacy.' 97 Briefs submitted to the
Court neither assessed whether the Secretary's interpretation has
detrimental effects on education finance in the two challenging districts,
nor inquired whether the Secretary's formula potentially masks an un-
equalized education funding scheme. Both outcomes would be contrary
to congressional intent in enacting Impact Aid.
Briefs also neglected to address the failure of the Secretary to engage
in notice-and-comment rulemaking after the changes to statutory
language in 1994,98 and never explored the sincerity of the Secretary's
193. Id. at 1559.
194. Id.
195. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Only an amicus brief submitted by fifty-four New Mexico public school districts in support
of Respondents draws the Court's attention to possible funding losses that will be incurred by other
school districts if New Mexico is deemed un-equalized, is no longer allowed to consider Impact Aid
in its funding allotments, and thereafter fails to find additional funding to offset the loss. The brief
goes on to primarily argue that a sudden change in status would be harmful to school districts, and
requests the Court grant only prospective relief. Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae
and Brief of Amici Curiae Public School Districts in Support of Respondents at 11-12, 32-33, Zuni
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007) (No. 05-1508), 2006 WL
3742249.
198. The Department maintains that it declined to engage in notice-and-comment procedures
because the regulations were essentially a "re-issuance of regulations that had initially been
promulgated in 1976, and those preexisting regulations were issued through notice-and-comment
procedures." Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 40.
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assertion that the interpretation allows for the most consistent
determination of disparity from state to state. The fact that only three
states, New Mexico, Kansas, and Alaska, even aspire to prove equalized
funding for purposes of Impact Aid'9 9 begs the question of why the
Secretary cannot make determinations of equality on a case-by-case
basis, thus avoiding the problem of potentially masking funding
inequalities.
Oral argument, which focused almost entirely on the doctrinal
parameters of Chevron review, did not fare any better than the briefs.
The hour largely mirrored briefs submitted in the case, and was limited
to the question of whether Congress actually spoke to the precise
question at issue, debates on what could be gleaned from legislative
history, and the definition of the word "percentile., 200  The latter topic
created mass confusion among the Justices. 20 1 The Court's majority and
dissenting opinions continued the trend, analyzing congressional intent,
and completely ignoring questions of equity.
The nearly exclusive focus on the purely doctrinal aspects of
Chevron review in the case was overwhelmingly constraining. The
parties' efforts to decide "who gets to decide" led to a complete failure to
understand the policy implications of the formulas at the level where it
counts-public school education in New Mexico. The constraints of
Chevron review also eclipsed an opportunity for the Department to prove
that its decision-making process was comprehensive, that it brought
agency expertise to bear in making a decision, and that congressional
goals were achieved through the Department's interpretation.
The narrow presentation of the case was particularly problematic as
the Court proceeded to step two of Chevron analysis. Conflicting but
equally plausible interpretations of the plain language and legislative
history of the Impact Aid statute allowed the majority to determine that
Congress did not speak directly to the question at issue. 20 2 This was no
199. Id. at 9 n.2.
200. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Zuni, 127 S. Ct. 1534 (No. 05-1508).
201. See, e.g., id. at 11 (Justice Breyer: "What are, what is it we are distributing? A simple
question, I guess, for a statistician. I unfortunately am not one and can't find one, so I have no idea
what this statute means").
202. Scholars have opined as to how much clarity, or lack thereof, a Court must encounter
before moving to step two of Chevron review. For example, Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes,
73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 94-95 (1994), notes that deferential courts, who read Chevron as a strong signal
from the Supreme Court that courts should not interfere with agency interpretation unless the statute
clearly expresses a contrary meaning on the precise question at issue, generally find statutes silent or
ambiguous at step one, and tend to affirm agency interpretations at step two. In contrast, active
courts read Chevron as a limited suggestion that Courts may overturn an agency interpretation only
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surprise, as even Petitioners admitted during the administrative hearing
that the statute "may be ambiguous [as] to the precise formula that is to
be used., 203  At the second prong of review, the Court was tasked with
determining whether the Secretary engaged in a "permissible"
interpretation of the Impact Aid statute. Unable to glean a clear answer
from legislative history or plain meaning of the statute, the determination
of whether the interpretation was "permissible" should have involved an
inquiry into whether the effects of the Secretary's interpretation were in
line with congressional intent upon enacting Impact Aid.2° Once there,
however, the Court had insufficient information to properly determine
whether the Secretary's decision-making process was thorough, and
whether the Secretary's interpretation, in both theory and practice,
furthered congressional intent.
A. Congressional Intent and Policy Implications
As discussed earlier, Chevron review strikes a balance between
deference to congressional intent and deference to agency expertise in
the policy arena. The Chevron court emphasized the latter when noting
that "policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or
administrators, not to judges. 20 5  Even when, however, Congress is
deemed to have delegated policy decisions to agencies through
ambiguous statutory language, the agency's policy decisions must still be
reasonable in light of congressional intent; those policy decisions must
be consistent with a statute's underlying purpose,0 6 plain meaning,20 7 or
legislative history.20 8 In light of this mandate, a policy decision by an
if the court is certain about congressional intent regarding the meaning of the statute. Id.
Accordingly, active courts tend to find statutes clear at step one of Chevron review, and reach step
two less often. Id. Another commentator, Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859,
874-75 (1992), argues Courts must know what counts as evidence of a statute's meaning, how
significant the evidence is, and when enough evidence has been gathered to warrant a legal truth
about statutory meaning. Once such theories are established, the answer to the question of statutory
meaning varies based on the standards of proof required. Id. at 875-77. "How Clear is Clear" in
Chevron's Step One?, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1687, 1692-94 (2005) argues that at step one of Chevron
review, courts should consider the institutional preferences of Congress when deciding what level of
clarity is needed to determine whether Congress spoke clearly to the precise issue in question.
203. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 393 F.3d 1158, 1167 (2004) (quoting
record), vacated en banc, 437 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2006).
204. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 n.29 (1987) (discussing Chevron analysis).
205. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984).
206. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445 n.29.
207. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992).
208. NationsBank ofN.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995).
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agency that produces consequences contrary to congressional intent can
hardly be deemed a "permissible construction."
Impact Aid was originally enacted to ensure that students educated in
areas impacted by federal lands are not penalized by the inability of their
school district to levy taxes against those lands,2°9 and to provide support
for the equalization efforts of the states. The statute was amended in
1974 with the intent of avoiding duplicative compensation to LEAs
impacted by federal lands. 2'0 The statute accomplishes all three goals by
providing aid to LEAs while also allowing states to consider the aid
received by LEAs if the Secretary considers that state equalized. 21 1
True to its original purpose, Impact Aid goes to many school districts
on or near American Indian reservations. The Aid often comprises
significant portions of these school districts' budgets, 1 2 and helps the
districts address unique learning challenges faced by Native American
schoolchildren. When cuts to Impact Aid are made, school districts on or
near tribal lands often suffer the most, prompting Senator Tom Daschle
to note that cuts to Impact Aid make it "harder for Native Americans to
receive [the] high quality education they deserve., 21 3 In the aftermath of
Aid cuts, school districts like the Lapwai School District in Idaho,
located within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, have to choose between
paying for extra academic programs that help students excel
academically and making desperately needed capital improvements.1 4
Zuni Public School District and Gallup-McKinley Public School
District are similarly compromised. Both school districts have felt the
impact of insufficient funding for education, and argue that allowing
New Mexico to reduce their equalization distribution by the amount
209. 20 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000).
210. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 16 (noting the purpose of the
exception was to "prevent [lI]mpact [A]id from hindering states' equalization efforts and [to prevent]
duplicative compensation [to] school districts affected by federal activity (once by the federal
government through impact aid and a second time by the state's equalization program)").
211. 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1).
212. See Bryan Jernigan, Lapwai School District Depends on Impact Aid, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.) Feb. 19, 2003, at DI, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfmid=1045754055 (In 2003, Impact Aid accounted for twenty-nine percent of Lapwai's
total operating budget, leading Superintendent Harold Otto to note that "[w]ithout Impact Aid, our
school district would shut down").
213. David Melmer, South Dakota Schools Lose Due to Cuts in Impact Aid, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.) Mar. 19, 2003, at BI, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfm?id= 1048084252.
214. See Jernigan, supra note 212 (explaining that despite the success of reading programs that
have brought significant percentages of students to grade level, the district must consider foregoing
the programs to instead address building ventilation and mold problems that are causing illness in
teachers and students).
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received in Impact Aid 215 has led to a "shortfall of support for some of
the neediest public school students in the state.' 216 Petitioners emphasize
that educating Native American children in rural, isolated environments
entails addressing special problems that stem from poverty, language
differences and cultural differences. 217 "Just 28[%] of Native American
ninth-graders in New Mexico are reading at grade level," compared to
"35[%] for the state's Hispanic students, and 62[%] for [the state's]
Anglo students., 2 18  "More than 80[%] of students in the Gallup-
McKinley district are Native American, and all students in the Zuni
district are Native American., 219 Tutoring and other academic programs
for which Impact Aid pays would help close the performance gap for
these students.2 2 °
Moreover, the districts' compromised taxing capacity has impeded
their ability to fund capital improvements. New Mexico's capital outlay
funding system, which has previously been declared unconstitutional due
to a failure to abide by the state constitution's "uniformity clause, 22 1 is
continually being monitored by a New Mexico District Court. Through
the Public School Capital Outlay Act, the state evaluates the adequacy of
facilities in each district and provides funding for facilities based upon
relative need.222  Wealthier districts with higher bonding and taxing
capacities, however, are also able to approve additional local property
levies, and issue general obligation bonds to independently raise
additional resources for capital improvements. In addition, districts with
political clout may be able to obtain direct legislative appropriations for
capital outlay projects, as was the case in May of 2006 when
Albuquerque's West Side received its share of an extra $90 million for
capital projects in high-growth areas.223
215. SCH. BUDGET & FIN. ANALYSIS BUREAU, supra note 47, at 11 ("The state takes credit for
75[%] of all Impact Aid revenues flowing to local districts... when calculating the state
equalization guarantee.").
216. Gabriela C. Guzman, Civil War Over School Funding, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 7, 2007, at
B1.
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 94, at 18.
218. Guzman, supra note 216.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. National Access Network Webpage, New Mexico: Historical Background, April 7, 2006,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nm/litnm.php3 (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) (citing Zuni School
District v. State, CV-98-14-I1 (Dist. Ct. McKinley County, Oct. 14, 1999)).
222. SCH. BUDGET & FIN. ANALYSIS BUREAU, supra note 47, at 8.
223. National Access Network Webpage, New Mexico Plaintiffs Claim State is Backtracking on
Capital Funding, May 11, 2006, http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/5-11-06nmfacilities
review.php3 (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
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Unfortunately, these additional options are not available to poorer
districts with impaired taxing capabilities. Accordingly, facilities in low
property-wealth districts like Zuni and Gallup-McKinley have
deteriorated.2 24  In the Gallup-McKinley school district, construction
delays have forced middle schools to operate out of portable classrooms
with no running water and inadequate heating.225 Both districts need the
additional resources provided by Impact Aid to repair and replace
dilapidated school buildings. 26
Additional funding is also needed to provide housing and salary
incentives for teachers in the two districts.227 In Zuni, where district-
provided housing is often the only option for school employees who are
not tribal members, teachers make do with trailer homes.228 Educators
living in the trailers have had to deal with raw sewage backing up into
their homes, or deteriorated construction which in one trailer led to a
toilet literally falling through the floor.229 To compound hiring problems,
New Mexico's education funding system makes additional payments to
those districts that employ advanced-degree teachers. 230 But in districts
like Zuni or Gallup-McKinley that depend on national programs like
Teach for America to recruit recent college graduates to teach, rural
isolation and poor conditions compromise the districts' ability to hire and
retain highly-qualified teachers. 231 The result is that wealthier and more
desirable districts easily retain their teachers and receive additional
funding to support their higher salaries, while the impacted districts do
not receive additional funding, but nevertheless have to pay higher
salaries to attract instructors. Zuni Superintendent Kaye Peery notes that
additional funding is desperately needed to attract and retain highly-
qualified teachers for the rural district.
232
224. National Access Network Webpage, New Mexico Historical Background, Apr. 7, 2006,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nm/lit-nm.php3 (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
225. Guzman, supra note 216.




230. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-24 (West 2003 & West Supp. 2006); SCH. BUDGET & FIN.
ANALYSIS BUREAU, supra note 47, at 5 (noting that calculations of program cost for each district
consider a district's "training and experience index"); BALL & GARCIA, supra note 50, at 5-6
(explaining how New Mexico's "training and experience index" is determined and applied to
calculate program costs). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 94, at 18.
231. Guzman, supra note at 216.
232. See id (.'How can a school district recruit highly qualified teachers under conditions like
these?' Peery asked.").
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Accordingly, the Secretary's formula may allow New Mexico to
ignore not a problem of horizontal equity, but one of vertical equity and
adequacy. New Mexico's funding formula does result in per-pupil
expenditures that are equalized on paper. For the 2000 fiscal year, a per-
pupil revenue of $3320 placed Zuni at thirteenth in a ranking of districts
throughout the state.233 Although the first ranked Mosquero district still
had approximately $3200 more in per-pupil revenues, Zuni's per-pupil
expenditure for that year was just above the mean of $3192.08.234
Nevertheless, the unique needs of impacted districts populated by Native
American students warrant additional funding in order to successfully
provide adequate educations that result in academic achievement.
Although New Mexico's funding formula does use cost differentials,
the hardships suffered by both districts suggest that the formula fails to
account for the districts' significant academic, recruiting, and facilities
challenges. The funding formula does not, for example, account for the
330 housing units that Gallup-McKinley must provide for its teachers.235
As one Zuni school board member said, "educating a student here is not
the same as in Albuquerque. It takes a little bit more. 236 If both the
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley districts had received Impact Aid for the
2005-06 school year without a corresponding decrease in their state
equalization distributions, the districts would have received an additional
$4.6 million and $15.6 million, respectively. 237 This would have allowed
them to implement special academic support programs and make needed
capital improvements. This additional funding would not be the
"duplicative" compensation that Congress sought to prevent, but the
supplemental funding needed by the districts to educate its students in a
way that is comparable to other districts in the state with fewer special
needs. Moreover, as admitted by New Mexico Education Secretary
Veronica Garcia, the $50 million loss incurred by the state due to the
inability to take credit for Impact Aid payments is insignificant,238
233. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 58, at 19-20.
234. Id. at 19-21.
235. Ernest Mackel et al., Guest Opinion Column, Blame State, Not Schools, for Funding
Inequities, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 2, 2007, at A13 (containing response of the Zuni, Gallup-
McKinley, and Grants-Cibola school board presidents to New Mexico Secretary of Education
Veronica Garcia's statement that New Mexico distributes education resources in an equitable
manner).
236. Guzman, supra note 216.
237. See id (stating that the state took credit for $4.6 million of the $8.2 million in federal
Impact Aid given to Zuni, and S15.6 million of the $27.7 million given to Gallup-McKinley).
238. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, at 16-17, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007) (No. 05-1508), 2006 WL 3854045 (noting that Impact Aid payments
amount to only 2.6% of New Mexico's educational budget).
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particularly when compared to New Mexico's fiscal strength, 239 and the
$2.2 billion the state spends annually on public education.24 °
As has been illustrated, state aid which supplements a district's
shallow tax base may fall far short of the amount needed to educate
underachieving, isolated students in a district with deteriorating facilities.
Accordingly, the Department of Education cannot use horizontal equity
measures alone to accurately assess whether a state's funding system
provides enough to meet the fair cost of adequately educating students
with special needs. Yet, this is precisely what the Department of
Education's equalization formula does. Technically referred to as a
"restricted range ratio,,' 241 the Department's practice of comparing
revenue at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles assesses the degree of
horizontal equity. This is true whether percentile cut-offs are based on
the number of LEAs or student population. As such, the formula fails to
account for vertical equity or adequacy in New Mexico.
242
Arguably, the Secretary has little control over the equalization
formula preferred by Congress. Congressional language mandates the
restricted range ratio, and the Secretary cannot independently replace the
ratio with a formula that takes better account of vertical equity. The
Secretary can, however, consider the consequences of both versions of
the restricted range ratio in light of congressional intent. Without the
additional aid, Zuni and Gallup-McKinley are forced to address the very
situation Congress intended to prevent: an inability to effectively address
achievement gaps, maintain adequate facilities, or attract qualified
teachers because of the presence of tax-exempt federal lands in the
school district. This consequence suggests that use of the harder-to-meet
equalization formula, which bases percentile cut-offs on the number of
239. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of New Mexico, Governor Richardson
Releases Statement on New Revenue Estimates (Oct. 23, 2006), available at http://
www.governor.state.nm.us/press/2006/oct/102306 02.pdf (announcing an additional $576 million in
recurring revenues will be available for the 2007 legislative session, $913 million is estimated to be
available for capital outlay projects, and $142 million is estimated to be set aside for efforts to
modernize schools across the State).
240. See Guzman, supra note 216 (discussing interview with New Mexico Education Secretary
Veronica Garcia, in which she expressed that the issue is not the money but the questioning of "the
philosophical foundation of [New Mexico's] funding formula").
241. See ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 8, at 235-36 (explaining that the federal range
ratio used by the federal government in the Impact Aid program is mathematically equivalent to the
restricted range ratio).
242. See, e.g., The National Association of Federally Impacted Schools, High Court to Rule on
Equalization, Jan-Feb., 2007, at 8, available at http://www.nafisdc.org/images/Jan-Feb%2007%
201mpact%20Newsletter.pdf ("[Tihe current position held by the Department... does not insure
that all children within a state receive a [sic] 'adequate education,' but rather only recognizes a form
of spending per pupil that, although equalizes per-pupil spending as interpreted by the regulations,
makes no attempt to insure students within a state are receiving an adequate education.").
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LEAs, might have been warranted. Such a choice is even more
appropriate in light of plain statutory language that seems to require it.
The constraining nature of Chevron review, however, led to the Court's
failure to either consider the consequences of the Secretary's
interpretation, or evaluate how those consequences informed the
Secretary's decision. Accordingly, the Court was unable to accurately
determine whether the Secretary's interpretation and ensuing choice of
formula were in accordance with congressional intent.
B. Agency Expertise and the Department of Education
Ensuring the quality of primary and secondary education is a job
historically left to state and local governments. Congress established the
Department of Education in 1979 as a cabinet-level agency through the
Department of Education Organization Act (DEOA).2 43 Although one of
the Department's seven stated purposes is to "supplement and
complement the efforts of States" in improving the quality of
education,244 the Act specifically notes that the establishment of the
Department did not "increase the authority of the Federal Government
over education or diminish the responsibility for education which is
reserved to the States and the local school systems. 245  In addition,
neither the Secretary nor the Department of Education can exercise any
"direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum [or] program of
instruction... of any educational institution, school, or school system,
except to the extent authorized by law."
246
The emphasis on local control of education has similarly been
reinforced by the Supreme Court. In Milliken v. Bradley,247 the Court
emphasized that "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of schools. 248 Likewise, the
Court in United States v. Lopez249 noted that although "Congress has
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate.., commercial
activities that ... affect the educational process," that authority "does not
include the authority to regulate each and every aspect of local
243. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 102, 93 Stat. 670 (1979)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3402 (2000)).
244. 20 U.S.C. § 3402(2) (2000).
245. Id. § 3403(a).
246. Id. § 3403(b).
247. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
248. Id. at 741.
249. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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schools., 250  As such, schools are controlled locally and the majority of
decisions that affect hiring, curriculum and funding are made by
individual school districts.
251
Accordingly, the Department interacts at an arm's length distance
with local education agencies.252 Even the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 (NCLB), 253 a law that represented a dramatic departure from the
federal government's traditional hands-off approach to state and local
education, 254 evinces an effort on the part of federal lawmakers to avoid
taking too heavy a hand in public school operations. NCLB does not
impose any uniform federal student assessment measure upon the states,
opting instead to require individual states to develop assessments and
submit them for approval to the Department of Education.255
This is not to say, however, that the federal government has played
absolutely no role in ensuring quality education. To the contrary, the
federal government administers hundreds of educational aid programs,
including Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act256 -
"the largest single federal investment in schooling." 257 Historically, the
federal government has also supported the equalization of educational
opportunities for students and has played a major policy role in the
education of "insular and discrete'258  student populations. 9
250. Id. at 566.
251. Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, 88, 93 (Jay P. Heubert ed.,
1999).
252. Judith A. Winston, Achieving Excellence and Equal Opportunity in Education: No Conflict
of Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 997, 1007 (2001). See also Michael Heise, The Political Economy of
Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 134 (2006) (noting that the federal government has had
little to do with most of the nation's primary and secondary schools).
253. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
254. Historically, the federal government has preferred to suggest, and encourage states to adopt,
voluntary reform goals. In contrast, NCLB is the first federal education program to impose
requirements that students progress to a measure of proficiency within a certain time period.
255. Heise, supra note 252, at 141. The one aspect of the Act which imposes a test-the
requirement for participation in the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) testing
program-does not trigger consequences for a state or district's failure to participate. Id.
256. The Department of Education has, however, been criticized for its failure to issue
guidelines governing the use of aid program funds, the lack of which has led to abuse. See McUsic,
supra note 251, at 94 (discussing how lack of guidelines has led to disparate treatment of schools
who need the funding the most).
257. Inst. of Educ. Sciences, Nat. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display
.asp?id=158 (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
258. Heise, supra note 252, at 134.
259. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMMC'NS & OUTREACH, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., GUIDE TO U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC. PROGRAMs 56 (2006), available at http://www.ed.gov/programs/gtep/gtep.pdf
(referencing Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, a federal program that provides
financial assistance to local education agencies and schools "with high numbers or high percentages
of poor children to ... ensure that all children meet challenging state academic standards"); id. at
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Furthermore, the Department of Education serves as a "clearinghouse"
for "ideas, facts and figures" related to the improvement of education,60
monitors local education agencies, 261  and enforces federal anti-
discrimination laws in federally funded educational institutions through
the Department's Office of Civil Rights.262
The Department of Education has also played a role in ensuring
quality education for Native American students in particular. The
Department maintains an Office of Indian Education, the mission of
which "is to support the efforts of local educational agencies, Indian
tribes and organizations, postsecondary institutions, and other entities to
meet the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of
American Indians... so that these students can achieve to the same
challenging state standards as all students." 263 Moreover, the Department
is familiar with the unique challenges faced by children living on Indian
reservations, and has noted that "Impact Aid is often an extremely
important source of revenue for school districts that serve children living
on Indian reservations and other Indian lands, because these districts
frequently have a very small local property tax base from which to raise
revenue for schools. ' 26
Accordingly, the Department possesses considerable expertise that
should have been brought to bear in considering the consequences of its
application of the federal equalization formula. In particular, the Department
252 (referencing Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a federal program that
provides grants to states to assist with the "costs of providing special education and related services
to children with disabilities"); id. at 227 (referencing Even Start, a federal grant program which
supports local family literacy programs "that integrate early childhood education, adult literacy ...
parenting education, and interactive parent and child literacy activities for low-income families").
260. Richard W. Riley, The Role of the Federal Government in Education-Supporting a
National Desire for Support for State and Local Education, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 29, 36
(1997).
261. School accountability as maintained by the Department of Education, however, differs from
accountability provided by other regulatory agencies. Paul Weckstein, co-director of the Center for
Law and Education, has written about the dearth of accountability regarding federal programs that
regulate local schools in the area of standards-based reform. Most teachers are not familiar with the
substantive provisions of the federal programs that regulate their schools, and non-compliance is not
considered outside the norm. In contrast, when FDA issues rules regarding medication, the norm is
that doctors will become immediately aware of those rules, that there will be a high degree of
compliance, and that the agency will be ready to take remedial action should it discover regulations
have not been followed. Paul Weckstein, School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality
Education, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, 306, 319 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
262. Riley, supra note 260, at 39.
263. ED.gov, Ensuring No American Indian and Alaska Native Child is Left Behind, http://
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oese/oie/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
264. OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INDIAN
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE IMPACT AID PROGRAM: SPECIAL IMPACT AID PROVISIONS FOR




should understand the methodological flaws inherent in the formula it
uses to determine equalization among the states. The "restricted range
ratio '265 compares revenue at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles to
assess the degree of horizontal equity in a state school system. The ratio,
however, only measures two extreme points in a data set. As such, the
restricted range ratio is a poor indicator for assessing the degree of equity
in an entire education system,266 and fails to provide information
concerning the entire distribution of per-pupil revenues. As a result, the
formula is limited in its ability to detect inequity in a school finance
system, 267 and fails to consider the amount of vertical equity needed to
provide adequate education for all students.
Although the Secretary cannot mandate the use of an alternate
formula, the Secretary can use its understanding of the methodological
flaws in the formulas, and the context of equalization in New Mexico, to
make a decision about which formula to use. The Secretary is aware that
once deemed equalized, a state is likely to reduce its funding to impacted
districts by the amount of Aid received by those districts. The
Department must also be aware that it is precisely those districts with
compromised taxing capabilities that are most likely to be affected when
a state exercises its option to offset Impact Aid. Moreover, it is
foreseeable that impacted districts populated by Native American
students are more likely to have special needs that warrant additional
funding to ensure adequacy. In light of the context of equalization in
New Mexico, and the knowledge that the formula which bases percentile
cut-offs on student population is particularly problematic in New
Mexico, the Secretary should have considered using the equalization
formula which was harder for New Mexico to meet. The easier standard
made it possible for New Mexico to qualify as an equalized state, but
resulted in denying additional funding to those students who need it the
most.
Of course, it is possible that the Department considered the
consequences of applying both versions of the equalization formula, and
nevertheless decided that its formula was the best option. Neither
submitted briefs nor transcripts of oral argument, however, illustrate that
the Department considered the actual consequences of its formula on
265. See ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 8, at 235-36 (explaining that the federal range
ratio used by the federal government in the Impact Aid program is mathematically equivalent to the
restricted range ratio).
266. ODDEN & PICUS, supra note 14, at 61.
267. ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE
69 (1984) (illustrating that the inability of the federal range ratio to measure per-pupil revenues for
all students results in a failure to detect an unequal proportional increase in per-pupil revenue).
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impacted districts in New Mexico. There is also no indication that the
Department evaluated whether its formula deemed New Mexico
equalized at the expense of the population that Congress sought to
protect through the enactment of Impact Aid.
Furthermore, although determining disparity among school districts
is inherently an exercise in statistics, the Department completely failed to
consider statistical analysis issues in its interpretation. In his opinion,
Justice Breyer took comfort in the fact that the Court's interpretation of
the Impact Aid Statute, which mirrored the Department's interpretation,
had not been challenged by any statistician.268 Justice Breyer's comfort,
however, is fleeting. In his article, A Sixty Million Dollar Statistical
Issue in the Interpretation and Calculation of a Measure of Relative
Disparity, Professor Joseph L. Gastwirth of the George Washington
University Department of Statistics examined the Department's
interpretation and found it statistically flawed. Contrary to the Court's
assertion that there are multiple ways to read the Impact Aid statute,
Professor Gastwirth argues that the statistically straightforward
interpretation of the statute is the interpretation advocated for by
Petitioners.269 As Professor Gastwirth explains:
[T]he statute specifies a population of LEAs, the individual units, and
the characteristic of interest is the AE [average per-pupil expenditure]
of the LEA. By arranging the LEAs in increasing order of their
expenditures, we obtain the distribution of the AEs in the universe of
LEAs in the state .... The disparity calculation is made by first taking
the difference ... between the 95th percentile and the fifth percentile of
the AEs of the LEAs. The 95th and fifth percentiles are used in the
calculation as the statute clearly states that LEAs with expenditures (or
revenues) "above" the 95th or 'below' the fifth percentile should be
disregarded.
270
To support this assertion, Professor Gastwirth conducted an informal
survey of twenty-seven professional statisticians. Among all twenty-
seven respondents, only two interpreted the Impact Aid statute in the
same way as the Department of Education, and then only as a possible
alternative interpretation assuming the number of pupils would be
reported.271  The overwhelming majority of statisticians surveyed
268. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1546 (2007).
269. J.L. Gastwirth, A Sixty Million Dollar Statistical Issue Arising in the Interpretation and
Calculation of a Measure of Relative Disparity: Zuni Public School District 89 v. U.S. Department
of Education, 5 LAW, PROBABILITY, & RISK 33, 39 (2006).




understood the Impact Aid statute in the same manner advocated for by
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley.272
In addition to highlighting that the Department's interpretation of the
Impact Aid statute is out of step with the understanding of most
professional statisticians, Professor Gastwirth also identified statistical
infirmities with the Department's interpretation. Specifically, if one or
both of the LEAs at the high and low end of the distribution contained at
least five percent of the population, those LEAs would be the fifth or
ninety-fifth percentile in the distribution, and would not be eliminated
from disparity determinations.273  Thus, despite the Department's desire
to eliminate outliers, the Department's own interpretation can
nevertheless fail to remove LEAs with anomalous characteristics.
27 4
Moreover, the Department incorrectly asserts that eliminating LEAs,
without first considering pupil population, will necessarily disadvantage
states with a small number of large school districts.275  Such a
disadvantage will only occur when there are at least twenty districts in a
state, many of which must also be small.276
Despite the presence of these statistical issues, the Department of
Education neither used a statistician as an expert witness during the
lower court proceedings, nor gave the Supreme Court any indication that
it consulted statisticians for its interpretation of the Impact Aid statute.
As perhaps an indication of the Department's failure to carefully work
with the data it was given, Professor Gastwirth discovered an arithmetic
error in the Department's analysis.277
The Supreme Court has stated that the weight afforded
administrative agencies "'will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, [and] the validity of its reasoning.' ' 278 The Court has
also stated that deference will depend on the "related expertise of the
272. See id at 44 (stating that twenty-five of the responses to the two versions of the study
corresponded with the plaintiff's calculation and interpretation).
273. Id. at 53.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 35-36, 53
276. Id. Professor Gastwirth also draws attention to the methodological infirmities of the Impact
Aid formula which apply to both Petitioners' and Respondents' interpretation of the statute. For
example, the formula is based on an averaging process that reduces variation in the data, potentially
masking a larger degree of variability in per-school inequality. Id. at 46. In addition, the practice of
eliminating LEAs at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles is not statistically sound for sets of data like
per-pupil expenditure among LEAs, which are not "normal" or distributed symmetrically around a
central value. Rather, the elimination of the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles are more appropriate
for data sets that are normal or distributed in a bell-shaped curve. Id. at 48-49.
277. Id. at 55.
278. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)).
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Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the
statute... and the careful consideration the Agency has given the
question over a long period of time., 279 Here, the Department failed to
consider the consequences of using a restricted range ratio, or to consult
a statistician even though the question at issue involved statistics.
Moreover, the Department provided unpersuasive justifications for its
interpretation, and even committed arithmetic errors when manipulating
the relevant data. These actions suggest careless and superficial
consideration of issues that were central to properly assessing disparity in
a state educational funding system. Accordingly, the Department's
interpretation should have been given very little weight, if any at all.
The doctrinal confines of Chevron review, however, constrained the
Court's review of agency interpretation. The application of Chevron
review did not encourage the Department to illustrate the extent to which
agency expertise was brought to bear in the Department's decision. Nor
did Chevron review encourage the Court to inquire. If the Court had
inquired, it would have been clear that there was little agency expertise
on the Department's part to actually consider.
C. A Solution: Resurrecting "Hard-Look" Review
The failure to consider the practical implications of the Secretary's
interpretation, to determine whether congressional intent is being met, or
to ensure whether the Department of Education spent sufficient time
considering its interpretation of the Impact Aid statute is particularly
problematic in light of the highly deferential second prong of Chevron
review 280 and the unlikelihood that once there, the Court will find the
Secretary's interpretation impermissible.281 Automatic deference without
consideration of the concerns invoked by the case led to a failure to
279. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
280. See Seidenfeld, supra note 202, at 96 ("Regardless of whether a reviewing court is
deferential or active, once it reaches step two it rarely reverses an agency interpretation as
unreasonable."); Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 314 (1996) ("Observers of modem administrative law
know that most of the action in Chevron cases is focused on step one. If the reviewing court finds
the relevant statute ambiguous, the agency's interpretation is almost always upheld at step two, with
little discussion by the court."); Levin, supra note 117, at 1261 (finding that "in the thirteen years
since Chevron, the Court has never once struck down an agency's interpretation by relying squarely
on the second Chevron step").
281. See Levin, supra note 117, at 1270 (noting that generally, the Court grants certiorari in
order to resolve clear-cut legal issues, and leaves to the lower courts responsibility for evaluating the
manner in which agencies apply legal principles to fact situations. Accordingly, the Court is
unlikely to take a case with the expectation of holding that the agency's interpretation passes step
one of Chevron review but fails step two).
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apply Impact Aid in its intended manner, to the detriment of New
Mexico schoolchildren.
The Court and the parties before it, however, could have been
released from the constraints of traditional Chevron review and freed to
consider these concerns if the Department was required to justify the
validity of its statutory interpretation. By requiring the agency to address
the policy implications of its interpretation, to illustrate that its
interpretation would not result in consequences that clash with
congressional intent, and to prove that its decision-making process was
thorough, the Court could have avoided rubber-stamping an agency
decision that warranted a more rigorous review.
Insisting that agencies justify their reasoning and policy decisions to
a court is hardly a new idea. When reviewing informal agency
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) "arbitrary
and capricious" standard,282 courts have invoked a standard of review
that extends deference to the agency but also mandates a "substantial
inquiry" into the facts.283 Although a court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency, and the agency's decision is entitled to a
"presumption of regularity," 284 a substantial inquiry into whether the
decision was made based on consideration of all relevant factors is still
required.285 In elaborating on this standard, the D.C. Circuit has written
that close scrutiny of evidence, particularly in complex matters, is meant
to educate the court, as the court must understand "enough about the
problem confronting the agency to comprehend the meaning of the
evidence relied upon and the evidence discarded; the questions addressed
by the agency and those bypassed; the choices open to the agency and
those made. 286 In this way, a court can determine whether the agency
decision was "rational and based on consideration of the relevant
factors.,
287
282. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
283. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971), overruled
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). In determining whether the
Secretary made a choice that was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, although the
Secretary's decision was entitled to a presumption of regularity, the applicable standards of § 706
required the Court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Id. at 415. To make a decision, the Court had
to make a searching and careful consideration of whether the decision was based on a consideration
of all relevant factors. Id. at 416. Nevertheless, the Court is not permitted to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. Id.
284. Id. at415-16.
285. Id.
286. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
287. Id. at 36.
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The application of arbitrary and capricious review is not without
challenge, and has been subject to critiques that it contributes to the
"ossification" of informal rulemaking.2 88  According to this critique,
arbitrary and capricious review, particularly as performed in the D.C.
Circuit, is both too intensive and too costly.289 To pass the arbitrary and
capricious review to which informal rules may be subject under the APA,
an agency must explain its reasoning in excruciating detail, respond to
every comment, and anticipate which issues will be of most concern to a
reviewing court.290 Moreover, even when agencies take these steps, there
is only a 50% chance their process will pass review.291 Faced with this
daunting task, agencies have become reluctant to use the informal
rulemaking process, despite the advantages of prior notice and public
participation that informal rulemaking provides.
292
In response to the critiques, scholars and judges alike argue that the
effects of arbitrary and capricious review do not warrant any changes in
standard. Judge Wald has written that when applying arbitrary and
capricious review, courts merely seek "to ensure that the agencies do
what Congress has told them to do and that they exercise discretionary
power in a reasonable fashion., 293  Additionally, Professor William S.
Jordan has found that agency regulatory programs have continued
despite failing arbitrary and capricious challenges, and that when rules
were remanded under arbitrary and capricious review, agencies tended to
recover quickly.
294
288. See William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (2000) ("[T]he 'arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of
discretion' standard has been a major culprit in the 'ossification of informal rulemaking."'); Thomas
0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419
(1992) ("The predictable result of stringent 'hard look' judicial review of complex rulemaking is
ossification."); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REv. 525, 528-29 (1997) ("[T]he hard look doctrine caused the
rulemaking process to 'ossify' to a disturbing degree."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and
Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 81, 82 (1996) ("There is a broad consensus among scholars that
ossification of the rulemaking process is the largest single implementation problem today.").
289. See, e.g., JORDAN, supra note 288, at 400 ("Hard look review is said to be too intensive, too
costly, and ineffective in assuring reasoned decisionmaking.").
290 Id.
291. PIERCE, supra note 288, at 83.
292. JORDAN, supra note 288, at 393.
293. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L.J. REv. 659, 662
(1997).
294. JORDAN, supra note 288, at 393-94.
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Despite the on-going debate, "hard-look" '295 arbitrary and capricious
review has long been thought to overlap substantially with the second
step of Chevron review. Judge Laurence Silberman, a D.C. Circuit Court
judge, first noted in 1988 that the second step of Chevron is "not all that
different analytically from the APA's arbitrary and capricious review,"
and that both require a court to ask whether the agency considered and
weighed the factors that Congress envisioned it would.2 96 Since then,
judges have noted the places in which the two doctrines converge and
diverge. The D.C. Circuit, the tribunal that hears a significant number of
challenges to agency action,297 has issued a line of opinions that have
highlighted the distinction between the two doctrines, including Arent v.
298Shalala. Arent noted that although Chevron review and arbitrary and
capricious review "overlap at the margins," the two doctrines ask
different questions: step two of Chevron review asks "whether an agency
has authority to act under a statute," while arbitrary and capricious
review asks whether the discharge of that authority was reasonable. 299
Similarly, Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC,300 a Fifth
Circuit case, has also drawn the distinction, noting that "'arbitrary and
capricious' review under the APA differs from Chevron step two review
because it focuses on the reasonability of the agency's decision-making
processes rather than on the reasonability of its interpretation.,
30 1
Scholars have also analyzed the extent to which the two review
schemas overlap. Finding that Chevron deference is under-girded by a
flawed pluralistic democracy model, Professor Mark Seidenfeld has
argued that a more satisfactory "deliberative democracy" requires a
revamping of Chevron review.30 2 In this new version of Chevron the
295. The D.C. Circuit has adopted this test for the review of informal policymaking under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("We have read the record with as hard a look as mortal judges can probably give."); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-36 (D.C. Cir, 1975) (noting that the court "must engage in a 'substantial
inquiry' into the facts, one that is 'searching and careful"').
296. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH, L.
REV. 821, 827-28 (1990) (citing Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 872 F.2d 1048, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (majority opinion of Silberman, J.)).
297. Levin, supra note 117, at 1256 (noting that the D.C. Circuit is the forum with the "greatest
frontline responsibility for judicial review of agency action").
298. 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
299. Id. at 615-16.
300. 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999).
301. Id. at410.
302. Seidenfeld, supra note 202, at 83. Professor Seidenfeld advocates for a modification to
Chevron review that fosters deliberative democracy. Through review of statutory interpretation
courts have an opportunity to interact with agencies and ensure agencies both act deliberatively and
remain politically accountable. Adding a policy emphasis to the second step of Chevron review
ensures that agencies have avoided excessive special interest influence. Id.
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emphasis would be on the second step instead of the first, and would
"[force] agencies to explain why their interpretations are good policy in
light of the purposes and concerns underlying the statutory scheme" in
question. °3 Professor Seidenfeld likens this revamped second prong to
the D.C. Circuit's arbitrary and capricious "hard look" test, and envisions
encouraging courts to require "agencies to identify those concerns that
the statute addresses and explain how the agency's interpretation took
those concerns into account., 30 4 Moreover, the agency would be forced
to explain "why it emphasized certain interests" instead of others, and be
required to address "contentions that its interpretation will have
deleterious implications.,
30 5
Going even further, Professor Ronald Levin has argued that while
step one of Chevron review should encompass all traditional tools of
306 t f~statutory construction, step two of Chevron review should be replaced
entirely with arbitrary and capricious review. 30 7  Professor Levin
characterized the second step of Chevron review as vague,38 verging on
internal incoherence, 309 and potentially redundant. 310 Replacing step two
with arbitrary and capricious review would transform the second prong
from being overly deferential to being a credible step in Chevron review
that ensures an agency's decision "is not only consistent with
congressional intent, but also socially responsible. 3 1
The substitution of arbitrary and capricious review might be
considered yet another step in the erosion of Chevron deference to
agency decisions. Indeed, recent Supreme Court cases have whittled
down the scope of agency deference. The Court in Christensen denied
303. Id.
304. Id. at 128-29.
305. Id.
306. This includes textual and non-textual statutory interpretation, statutory structure and
purpose, and legislative history.
307. Levin, supra note 117, at 1254.
308. See id. at 1260 ("The Court initially framed step two as a question of whether the agency's
interpretation is 'permissible,' but that phrasing was circular: obviously an interpretation that is not
permitted is prohibited, but on what grounds would the Court refuse to 'permit' an interpretation?").
309. See id. at 1260-61 ("Under the structure of the Chevron formula, a court should not reach
step two unless it has already found during step one that the statute supports the government's
interpretation or at least is ambiguous with respect to it. In other words, the agency's view is not
clearly contrary to the meaning of the statute. If the court has made such a finding, one would think
that the government's interpretation must be at least 'reasonable' in the court's eyes. Why, then, is
the second step not superfluous?").
310. See id. at 1277 ("Chevron step two inquiry contributes nothing to judicial review that
arbitrary and capricious review [in conjunction with Chevron step one review] does not already
provide.").
311. Id. at 1262.
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deference to a Department of Labor opinion letter that was not
promulgated subject to formal rulemaking procedures." l In Mead, a
tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service was
similarly denied deference because of the lack of formal procedures and
the sheer volume of tariff classification rulings issued by the department;
rulings "churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency's 46 scattered
offices" simply could not have the force of law.313 This was so, despite
ambiguity in the relevant administering statute, and the authoritativeness
of the agency's position regarding that ambiguity.314 In FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,3 15 the Court denied deference to the FDA's
assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products because it involved a
policy question that Congress could not have intended for the agency to
address unilaterally.31 6 Moreover, Barnhart v. Walton suggests that
Chevron deference will not always be given uniformly, but will be
assessed on a case-by-case basis.317
Similarly, substitution of arbitrary and capricious review for the
second prong of Chevron would deny agencies automatic deference in
the face of statutory ambiguity, in an effort to require agencies to justify
their decisions and encourage courts to perform nuanced and detailed
reviews of the processes used to make those decisions. In the Zuni case,
such a detailed look might have denied deference for an agency
interpretation motivated by an arguably reasonable, if impractical in
application, methodological intent. Nevertheless, the implementation of
arbitrary and capricious review in the Chevron framework has significant
benefits. Such an application would strengthen the overly deferential
nature of the second prong, transforming it into a test which genuinely
ensures that agency action is aligned with congressional intent.
Moreover, it would remove the artificial distinction drawn between the
legal interpretations usually associated with Chevron review, and the
reasoned decision-making usually associated with arbitrary and
capricious review. At the heart of arbitrary and capricious review is
careful examination of an agency's reasoning process; an evaluation,
therefore, of the conclusions an agency drew from its interpretation of a
312. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
313. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).
314. Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
316. Id. at 133.
317. 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002).
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statute during its reasoning process is a necessary and integral part of
arbitrary and capricious review.
3 18
Equating step two of Chevron review with arbitrary and capricious
review would also deter a court's inclination to review the decision-
making process employed by an agency without any regard to the policy
consequences of that agency's decision. The questionable policy
consequences of an agency's interpretation should be among the factors a
court considers when reviewing the decision-making process. 319  A
decision with absurd, short-sighted, or nonsensical consequences
necessarily calls into question the decision-making process, and should
prompt the court to require an agency explanation addressing how such a
decision resulted from a supposedly rational procedure.
D. Applying "Hard-Look" Review to Zuni
Although Respondents framed the issue as one of simple deference
to the Department of Education's choice of methodology, Zuni involved
the much broader topic of public school finance and how it affects equal
access to educational opportunities. Unfortunately, traditional Chevron
review constrained the parties' opportunities to educate the Court on the
practical effects of the Secretary's formula, thus denying the Court an
opportunity to make a proper determination of permissibility at step two
of Chevron review. To be sure, wrangling during oral argument and in
the briefs about the definition of the word "percentile" was important in
identifying the intent behind the Impact Aid program, but that
determination should not have been made in isolation from a review of
the practical effects of a chosen definition. Moreover, there was scant
evidence that the agency used its expertise regarding the academic
challenges faced by Native American schoolchildren or the
methodological weaknesses inherent in the equalization formulas at issue
to make a decision in the case.
Replacing the highly deferential second prong of Chevron review
with the "hard-look" of arbitrary and capricious review would have
required the Justices to "steep themselves in agency policy and the
substantive debate framing the issue, 3 20 and would have given the
Department an opportunity to explain why its interpretation was good
policy in light of the Impact Aid program's purpose.3 21 Professor
318. Levin, supra note 117, at 1273.
319. Id. at 1294.




Levin's model provides the appropriate structure for such a change to
Chevron review. At step one of Chevron review, the Court should use
all tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether Congress has
indeed spoken to the question at issue. In the Zuni case, tools of
statutory interpretation did not yield a clear answer: the plain language
did not address whether Congress intended for the Department to weight
LEAs based on population when ranking those same LEAs in order of
per-pupil expenditure; 322 legislative history could have been interpreted
both for and against the agency; and review of the statutory scheme in
which Impact Aid exists was inconclusive. As a result, the case should
have gone to step two of Chevron review.
Arbitrary and capricious review at step two of Chevron review
would have resulted in a more nuanced and holistic review of the
Secretary's interpretation, starting with a review of process. Such a
review would have asked why, for instance, the Department declined to
engage in formal notice-and-comment procedures when the statutory
language of Impact Aid changed in the 1994 re-authorization. The Court
could have also required the Department to detail the alternatives that
were considered. For instance, in light of the participation of just three
states in the Impact Aid program, did the agency consider making
equalization determinations on a case-by-case basis so as to avoid
masking un-equalized funding schemes? Alternatively, instead of
insisting that its interpretation was the only way to address outliers, could
the Department have instead relied on § 7709(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the statute,
which directed the Secretary to consider the costs of unique school
districts in its equalization determinations? Moreover, did the
Department consider the potential inability of its own methodology to
fail to remove district outliers?
Step two arbitrary and capricious review would have also
encouraged the Court to consider the practical consequences of the
Department's interpretation, and whether those consequences are in
contrast to congressional intent underlying Impact Aid. What will be the
effect of the Department's interpretation on educational funding for
students in New Mexico? In direct contradiction to congressional intent,
does the Secretary's interpretation negatively affect students impacted by
a federal presence in their school district? Does the interpretation allow
322. Arguably, Congress did not have to speak to this question because it used language
explicitly stating that LEAs are to be ranked based on per-pupil expenditure alone. In light,
however, of the Secretary's use of weighted ranking prior to 1994, and because of the inconclusive
results of legislative history and statutory construction review, a more nuanced review at step two is
warranted.
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a state to mask a funding system that is not genuinely equalized? In light
of evidence that the answer to the last two questions is "yes," why did
the Secretary insist on using the agency's easier-to-meet equalization
standard?
Finally, arbitrary and capricious "hard-look" review at step two of
Chevron review would have addressed the tension regarding agency
expertise. Neither submitted briefs nor oral argument in the case
suggested that the agency brought expertise regarding education of
Native American schoolchildren, methodological flaws inherent in
restricted range ratios, or statistical infirmities in the Department's own
interpretation to bear in making a decision.32 3 Not only would arbitrary
and capricious review have allowed the Department to illustrate the
extent to which its expertise informed the Secretary's interpretation, but
the review would have also provided for the appropriate deference once
that illustration was made. After all, arbitrary and capricious review
does not allow a Court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,
but rather ensures that a decision was made based on consideration of all
relevant factors required to make a decision that both falls within the
agency's scope of authority, and heeds the original intent of Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
At one point during oral argument in the Zuni case, Justice Breyer
noted, "What are, what is it we are distributing? A simple question, I
guess, for a statistician. I unfortunately am not one and can't find one, so
I have no idea what this statute means. 324 Although comedic, the quote
illustrates that the Justices were not presented with sufficient information
to properly determine at step two of Chevron review whether the
Secretary's interpretation was made with the expertise that Congress
intended the Department use, or whether the interpretation was in
furtherance of congressional intent. To avoid this problem in the future,
step two of Chevron review should be fortified with the standards of
arbitrary and capricious review so that the Supreme Court itself, or a
lower court on remand, can properly consider agency process, policy
consequences, pursuit of congressional intent, and agency expertise when
323. The Department did not maintain specific expertise on its part but did argue that "[t]he
uniform view of practitioners in the field of education finance.., is that a disparity test like the one
in the Impact Aid statute must take into account the number of pupils served by an LEA." Brief for
the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 17. The Department did not elaborate, however, on
whether such an application is reasonable if it eliminates twenty-five percent of LEAs in New
Mexico.
324. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 200, at 11.
2007]
196 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation. In light of the impact that
equalized funding has on the educational opportunities of students, such
a rigorous review in the Zuni case was not only warranted, but necessary.
